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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this case is proper pursuant to Utah Const, art. VIII, §§3 and 5, 
and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS 
This appeal is from the district court's entry of summary judgment and from the 
district court's dismissal of remaining claims for failure to prosecute. 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1996). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 
P.2d 374, 377 (Utah App. 1997). In reviewing a summary judgment, the facts are viewed in 
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d at 362. 
The issues to be considered in determining whether the district court correctly 
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that appellee Russell J. 
Limb ("Limb") was entitled to judgment as a matter of law include the following: (1) Did 
the Smiths' actions in their bankruptcy proceeding judicially estop the Smiths from 
subsequently asserting a right to an equity of redemption in Limb's property; (2) Was Limb 
on actual or constructive notice of the Smiths' claim to the title of his property; (3) Did the 
post-default agreements alleged by the Smiths' abrogate their claim to an equitable mortgage 
to Limb's property; and (4) Did the Smiths prior conduct bar their ability to seek equitable 
redress for their alleged injuries? 
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Whether a district court properly dismissed an action for failure to prosecute is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 
P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). The district court 
has broad discretion in dismissing actions for failure to prosecute, and the district court's 
decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that injustice has 
occurred. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. 
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Charlie Brown Constr. Co.. 740 P.2d at 1370. 
Whether a district court properly ruled on a motion for relief from judgment under 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Birch 
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). The district court has broad discretion in 
ruling on such motions. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellant Penn H. Smith originally filed this action on October 8, 1992 seeking 
damages against appellees Richard H. Tyler and Ina W. Tyler for breach of contract. 
According to the original complaint, the Tylers failed to pay to Mr. Smith certain proceeds 
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from a real estate transaction that occurred on September 16, 1991 in which the Tylers sold 
certain parcels of real estate located in Washington County, Utah to Limb. Some two years 
later on June 29, 1994, Mr. Smith, along with Mary Anne Smith and EPS Development 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Smiths"), filed a Second Amended Complaint to 
which Limb was joined as a defendant. In the Second Amended Complaint, the Smiths came 
up with a new theory that certain absolute conveyances of the subject property to the Tylers, 
the predecessors in title to Limb, were actually equitable mortgages and that, although Limb 
is an innocent purchaser without any knowledge regarding the alleged equitable mortgages, 
the properties remain subject to those mortgages. 
Limb filed for and was granted summary judgment against the Smiths' claims of 
equitable mortgage based on three grounds. First, that the Smiths were judicially estopped 
from asserting an equity of redemption because of their specific disclaimer of any interest in 
the subject properties in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Second, that the Smiths cannot 
enforce an equity of redemption against Limb who was a bona fide purchaser for value from 
the Tylers protected by the provisions of the Utah Recording Act. Third, even if the Smiths 
held an equity of redemption, their alleged equitable mortgages were abrogated by specific 
agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers. 
After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Limb, a remaining claim 
between the Smiths and the Tylers languished for many months. During that period of time, 
title to Limb's property remained encumbered by a lis pendens that had been recorded by 
Smiths giving notice of the pendency of this action. Limb moved the court to dismiss the 
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action for failure to prosecute or alternatively to certify the summary judgment as a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After conducting a 
hearing, the trial court determined to dismiss the remaining claims in the case for lack of 
prosecution and a final judgment was subsequently entered. 
Smiths brought this appeal challenging (1) the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Limb, and (2) the trial court's dismissal of the remaining claims for lack of 
prosecution. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Limb filed his motion for summary judgment against appellants on March 7, 1995. 
After the summary judgment motion was fully briefed and argued, Judge J. Philip Eves 
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendant Limb's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on April 27, 1995. In that opinion, Judge Eves, after a careful review of the 
evidence submitted by Limb, concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and that Limb was entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of (1) judicial estoppel, (2) 
the Utah Recording Act, and (3) abrogation of equitable mortgages. [R. 660-667.]l 
Judge Eves also granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Tylers and in favor of 
Security Title Company on a pending third-party complaint. After the summary judgments 
were entered, all claims in the case were dismissed as against Limb, but certain claims 
remained pending between the Smiths and the Tylers arising from or relating to certain water 
rights claimed by the Smiths. As a result, there was no final appealable order and title to 
lA copy of Judge Eves' opinion is included in the appendix to this brief. 
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Limb's property remained encumbered by the lis pendens recorded against the subject 
property by the Smiths. 
On July 18, 1996, Limb filed in the district court a motion to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution or, alternatively, to certify partial summary judgment as final. That motion was 
heard by Judge Eves and on December 23, 1996, Judge Eves entered a final judgment 
incorporating the summary judgment rulings and dismissing all other claims. [R. 730.]2 
On December 23, 1996, the Smiths filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the judgment. That motion came before the court on 
February 10, 1997 and the Smiths failed to appear at the hearing either in person or by 
counsel. Consequently, on March 10, 1997, Judge Eves entered an order denying the motion 
to set aside the judgment. [R. 785.] 
The Smiths filed their original notice of appeal on January 22, 1997. After the court 
issued its order denying the Rule 60(b) motion, the Smiths filed an amended notice of appeal 
on April 11, 1997. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On or about November 10, 1987, the Tylers loaned to the Smiths the sum of $26,500 
evidenced by a promissory note (the "First Loan"). [R. 543.] As security for the First 
Loan, the Smiths agreed to deliver warranty deeds to the Tylers covering three parcels of 
property located in Washington County described in the Second Amended Complaint as 
parcels 1,2, and 3. [R. 544.] According to the agreement between the Smiths and Tylers, 
2
 A copy of the Final Judgment is included in the appendix to this brief. 
5 
title to parcels 1,2, and 3 would belong absolutely to the Tylers if the Smiths failed to repay 
the First Loan. Conversely, the Tylers agreed to deed parcels 1,2, and 3 back to the Smiths 
if the First Loan was timely repaid. Id. 
On or about November 4, 1988, the Smiths borrowed an additional $30,000 from the 
Tylers pursuant to a promissory note (the "Second Loan"). Id. To secure the Second Loan, 
the Smiths agreed to deliver a warranty deed conveying to the Tylers title to the property 
described as parcel 4 in the second amended complaint. Id. According to the agreement 
between the Smiths and Tylers, title to parcel 4 would belong absolutely to the Tylers if the 
Smiths failed to repay the Second Loan. Conversely, the Tylers agreed to deed parcel 4 
back to the Smiths if the Second Loan was timely repaid. [R. 494-95.] 
In conjunction with the Second Loan, the Tylers agreed to extend the term of the First 
Loan. A document entitled "Extension and Modification Agreement" containing legal 
descriptions of parcels 1,2, and 3 was executed by the Smiths and recorded at the 
Washington County Recorder's office on November 3, 1988. [R. 545.] The Extension and 
Modification Agreement is the only recorded document the Smiths rely upon as providing 
constructive notice that the absolute warranty deeds conveying to Tylers the title to parcels 1, 
2, and 3 were intended to be conditional conveyances as security for the First Loan. No 
document was recorded at the Washington County Recorder's office indicating that the 
absolute warranty deed given to Tylers for parcel 4 was intended as a conditional conveyance 
to secure repayment of the Second Loan. [R. 545.] 
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Both the First Loan and the Second Loan went into default and the Smiths failed to 
repay either loan. After the loans went into default, the Tylers sent numerous notices to the 
Smiths advising them of the defaults and demanding payment. [R. 546.] 
On or about November 13, 1989, the Smiths filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. As part of the debtors' 
schedules filed by the Smiths in their bankruptcy case, the Smiths listed an interest in parcels 
1,2, 3, and 4. [R. 546.] 
On or about August 1, 1990, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Judith A. Boulden entered an order 
in the bankruptcy case approving a stipulation between the Smiths and the Tylers regarding 
the disposition of parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4. The bankruptcy stipulation, as approved, provided 
that parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4 were to be listed for sale and, if sold within 21 months of June 
13, 1990, all proceeds were to be paid to the Tylers up to the amounts owed on the First 
Loan and Second Loan and the balance was to be deposited with the bankruptcy court. If not 
sold within the 21 month period, the Smiths were to withdraw all claims to the four parcels. 
[R. 546-47.] Upon execution of that stipulation, the Smiths agreed they no longer had an 
equity of redemption and that their bankruptcy estate would only have an interest in the 
proceeds of a sale. [R. 666.] 
On or about February 11, 1991, the Smiths wrote a letter to Duane H. Gillman, the 
United States Bankruptcy Trustee, in which, after referring to the loans from the Tylers, the 
Smiths stated: 
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We have been unable to repay the Tylers under the terms of the notes and 
agreements and the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers about a year befor 
[sic] we filed our chapter 11. 
At the time of filing our chapter 11 we had been in default for more than a year 
and the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers but upon the advice of our 
lawyer, he included them in the bankruptcy. This should have never been done. 
We now know that the advice we received from Mr. Petty to include theese [sic] 
properties in our bankruptcy was bad advice for we really had no claim to them. 
Please let this letter be our request to release the properties out of our bankruptcy. 
[R. 547.] Along with the February 11, 1991 letter, the Smiths filed with the bankruptcy 
court an ex parte motion to release real property in which they made the following 
statements: 
2. Upon the bad advice of previous counsel these four properties that were 
deeded to the Tylers more than two years prior to the filing of the debtors' Petition 
for Bankruptcy were included in the inventory of real property. 
3. The debtor is fearful that because of bad legal advice the Tylers have been 
damaged and should be granted the relief of regaining control of their property. 
[R. 547-48.] 
With respect to the letter and the motion filed with the bankruptcy court, appellant Penn 
Smith testified at his deposition: 
Q. And the reason you filed this document, again, was so that the 
bankruptcy court would release the property from the bankruptcy to the 
Tylers? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You wanted the property to be released from the bankruptcy -
A. That's correct. 
Q. — so Mr. Tyler could sell? 
A. That's correct. 
[R. 548.] 
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After receiving the letter and ex parte motion to release real property, the bankruptcy 
trustee, Mr. Duane Gillman, received a request for abandonment from Mr. and Mrs. Richard 
H. Tyler requesting that the trustee abandon parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4. [R. 548.] After 
reviewing the facts and circumstances and in reliance on the statements made in the February 
11, 1992 letter as well as the ex parte motion to release real property filed by the Smiths, 
Mr. Gillman signed a notice of abandonment in which he concluded: 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554, I have found the above listed property to not 
belong to the debtor, not be part of the bankruptcy estate, therefore, 
burdensome to the estate, and of inconsequential or no value to the estate. I 
have given notice of my intent to abandon such property during the meeting of 
creditors and there being no objection, or request for hearing, the Trustee 
hereby abandons any interest that the estate may have in and to said property. 
[R. 549.] The request for abandonment and notice of abandonment from the trustee were 
recorded at the office of the Washington County Recorder on September 16, 1991 as Entry 
No. 390753, in Book 618, at Page 719 in connection with the sale of the properties to Limb. 
[R. 549.] 
On or about August 19, 1991, the Tylers advised the Smiths that they had a potential 
purchaser for the properties and that it would be easier to sell the properties if certain water 
rights, then controlled by the Smiths, could be included as part of the sale. [R. 549.] The 
Smiths specifically allege in their Second Amended Complaint that: 
Under an agreement made at the meeting on August 19, Smiths agreed to 
relinquish any claim to the subject real property, in order to facilitate the sale 
of the property to Tylers' purchaser and Tylers agreed to pay Smiths the sum 
of $40,000. Twenty Thousand Dollars of said sum was attributed to Smiths' 
equity in the subject real property and $20,000 was attributed to Smiths' 
agreement to transfer the above mentioned water rights. 
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[R. 549-50.] The Tylers did not dispute the Smiths' allegation that an agreement was made 
on August 19, 1991 that the Tylers could sell the properties free from any claim of the 
Smiths. The only dispute between the Smiths and Tylers was on what amount was agreed to 
be paid by the Tylers to the Smiths. The Tylers claim that they agreed to pay the Smiths any 
amounts received from the sale over the balance then due on the First Loan and Second 
Loan. [R. 550.] 
After receiving notice from the bankruptcy trustee that the properties did not belong 
to the Smiths, the Tylers placed a sign on one of the parcels to advertise the properties for 
sale. [R. 550.] The Tylers subsequently agreed to sell the properties to Limb for the sum of 
$90,000. [R. 550.] The transaction whereby the Tylers sold the properties to Limb was 
closed through Security Title Company in St. George, Utah on September 16, 1991 upon the 
recordation of a warranty deed from the Tylers to Limb conveying title to the properties. 
[R. 550-51.] The proceeds from the sale to Limb, after transaction costs, were insufficient 
to cover the amounts that were owed on the First Loan and Second Loan. As a result, the 
Tylers did not pay any overage to the Smiths. [R. 551.] At the time that Limb acquired title 
to the properties, he had no knowledge that the Smiths had ever claimed any interest in title 
to the properties. [R. 551.] The property consisted of vacant land on which there were 
certain items of "junk" including "scrap steel and things of that nature." [R. 665.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly concluded that any one of three rules of law barred the 
Smiths' claim against Limb and, therefore, correctly entered summary judgment against the 
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Smiths and in favor of Limb. The Smiths' claim is barred on the basis of (i) judicial 
estoppel, (ii) doctrine of bona fide purchasers under the Utah Recording Act, and (iii) 
abrogation of equitable mortgages. Further, because summary judgment should be affirmed 
on any legal basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by the court in 
granting summary judgment, the district court's entry of summary judgment should be 
affirmed on the basis that the Smiths' inequitable conduct bars their claim for equitable 
relief. 
First, as to the judicial estoppel grounds, the Smiths' disclaimer of any interest in the 
property during their bankruptcy proceeding estops them from now asserting a claim against 
Limb's property. 
Second, the Smiths' claim against Limb is barred on the basis that Limb is a bona 
fide purchaser. The Smiths' do not allege any facts suggesting that Limb had actual 
knowledge of the Smiths' interest in the disputed property. Furthermore, the facts alleged by 
the Smiths regarding constructive notice ~ that there was some scrap steel on otherwise 
vacant land — do not, as a matter of law, establish "open, visible, and exclusive" possession 
that could give constructive notice of a claim against title. 
Third, the Smiths' claim is barred because the Smiths themselves have alleged at least 
two separate agreements that abrogated the claimed equitable mortgages. One such 
agreement is a stipulation entered into by the Smiths and Tylers during the Smiths' 
bankruptcy proceeding. This stipulation provided that the Smiths no longer had an equity of 
redemption and that their bankruptcy estate merely had an interest in any excess proceeds 
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from the sale of the properties. A second agreement between the Smiths and Tylers 
permitted the Tylers to sell the properties free of any claims by the Smiths. Both of these 
agreements operate to abrogate the Smiths' Claim of an equitable mortgage. 
Finally, general principles of equity bar the Smiths' attempt to resurrect their claim 
for an equitable mortgage. It is well established that one who seeks equity must do equity. 
In this case, the Smiths have failed to satisfy this equitable principle, because they disclaimed 
aU of their interest in the property to the bankruptcy court. On the basis of their disclaimer, 
the bankruptcy court released the property from their bankruptcy proceeding, thereby 
removing it as an asset to satisfy their creditors. Now, years later and after an innocent 
purchaser has bought the property, the Smiths seek to revive their claim for an equitable 
mortgage. Under such circumstances, equity mandates that the Smiths' claim against Limb 
be denied as a matter of law, because the Smiths have absolutely no equity vis a vis Limb. 
As to the district court's dismissal of the Smiths' remaining claim and refusal to set 
aside its order of dismissal, the record is replete with evidence supporting the district court's 
determination that dismissal of the Smiths' remaining claim was warranted on the basis of 
their failure to prosecute the claims. On this appeal, the Smiths have failed to demonstrate 
that the district abused its discretion in dismissing their remaining claim and refusing to set 
aside its order of dismissal. Indeed, the Smiths have completely failed to even brief the 
district court's refusal to set aside its final order, which dismissed their remaining claim. 
The dismissal and refusal to set aside should therefore be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LIMB 
A. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against 
Limb is Barred by Judicial Estoppel. 
Under the Utah formulation of judicial estoppel, "TA1 person may not, to the prejudice 
of another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same 
persons or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was 
successfully maintained.'" Stevensen v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) (first 
emphasis added) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 
(Utah 1995) (additional quotation omitted)). Utah courts have explained that the true 
"purpose of judicial estoppel is . . . safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from 
conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court." Salt Lake City v. Silver 
Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995); see also Jones. Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah 1996). 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in this case to bar the Smiths' current assertion 
that they maintain the equity of redemption in Limb's property. The Smiths do not dispute 
that they filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in The United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah. [R. 922; 546, 597-98.] Initially, the Smiths listed an interest in the 
properties as an asset in the schedules filed with the bankruptcy court. However, they 
subsequently wrote a letter to the bankruptcy trustee in which they disavowed any interest in 
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the properties. [R. 901.] The Smiths stated, "[W]e have no furthur [sic] claim upon these 
properties." [R. 901.] The Smiths also stated that because they had been unable to repay 
the Tylers, "the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers about a year befor [sic] we filed 
our chapter 11." [R. 901.] 
Simultaneous with their transmittal of this letter disclaiming all interest in the properties, 
the Smiths filed a motion with bankruptcy court to the same effect. [R. 902-03.] In this 
motion, the Smiths explain that they had deeded the properties to the Tylers more than two 
years prior to their filing of the bankruptcy petition. [R. 903.] Thus, the Smiths expressly 
took the position in their bankruptcy case that they had no interest in the property, a position 
at complete odds with the position they now assert. The district court found, and the Smiths 
do not dispute, that the bankruptcy trustee relied upon the Smiths' statements by signing a 
notice of abandonment, in which the trustee found and concluded that the Smiths had no 
interest or claim to the properties. [R. 662.] Hence, the Smiths were successful in their 
asserted position in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
The district court also found that the Tylers relied on the position taken by the Smiths 
relinquishing all claims to the properties. [R. 662-63.] This reliance is evidenced in part by 
the fact that the Tylers sold the properties to Limb and delivered to Limb a warranty deed. 
Obviously, if the Tylers believed that the Smiths claimed any further interest in the 
properties, they would not have delivered a warranty deed. The Smiths allege that the Tylers 
did not detrimentally rely on their statements claiming no interest in the properties. 
However, bare allegations alone are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
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judgment. See Dwieeins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) ("Bare 
allegations . . . unsupported by facts . . . are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment."). 
Here, the Smiths simply assert that because the Tylers were involved in an initial draft 
of the letter sent to the bankruptcy trustee, the Tylers could not have relied upon the Smiths' 
statements to the bankruptcy trustee and to the bankruptcy court that the Smiths claimed no 
interest in the properties. This argument does not contradict the finding by the district court 
that the Tylers relied upon the Smiths' statements. Instead, the Smiths' argument merely 
demonstrates that the Tylers were aware of the Smiths' statements and the purported basis 
for the Smiths' disclaimer of any interest in the properties-that the Smiths did not possess an 
equity of redemption or any other legal right in the properties. Further, the Smiths do not 
allege that the Tylers were aware of any possible legal claim that the Smiths could assert to 
the properties. In fact, the evidence presented by the Smiths strongly supports rather than 
contradicts the district court's finding of reliance. With respect to the statements made in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, Perm Smith testified: 
Q. And the reason you filed this document, again, was so that the Bankruptcy Court 
would release the property from the bankruptcy to the Tylers? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You wanted the property to be released from the bankruptcy ~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. - so Mr. Tyler could sell? 
A. That's correct. 
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[R. 867, 868-69.] This testimony manifests Penn Smith's intention that the Tylers rely on 
his statements by selling the properties. 
Thus, the undisputed facts are that (i) the Tylers were aware of the Smiths' statements 
disclaiming all rights to the properties; (ii) the Tylers took steps to sell the properties; (iii) 
the Tylers sold the properties; and (iv) the Tylers delivered a warranty deed to Limb for the 
properties. These undisputed facts show detrimental reliance by the Tylers, as the district 
court concluded, and the Smiths have failed to present any evidence tending to show that the 
Tylers did not rely on the Smiths statements made to the bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy 
court. Consequently, the Tylers possess the right to assert judicial estoppel against the 
Smiths. 
It is undisputed that Limb is in privity of estate with the Tylers. As a privity with the 
Tylers with respect to the properties, Limb is entitled to invoke the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel against the Smiths' claims. See Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that judicial estoppel "is applicable to defendants here, as successors in interest of 
the real property involved in [the] cases"). Therefore, the district court's entry of summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
B. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against 
Limb is Barred Because Limb is a Bona Fide Purchaser. 
Under Utah law, an unrecorded conveyance is "void as against any subsequent 
purchaser of the same property" where the subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in 
good faith and for valuable consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994). A bona fide purchaser for value entitled to the protection of the 
recording act is "one who takes without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient 
to put him on notice of the complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 303 
(Utah 1978). 
The district court found that Limb had no actual knowledge of the Smiths' claimed 
interest in the properties prior to his purchase of the properties and recordation of the deeds 
conveying title to him. [R. 664; 551, 597.] Additionally, the district court found, based on 
undisputed facts, that Limb did not have constructive notice of the Smiths' claimed equity of 
redemption prior to the recordation of his deed. [R. 664.] This finding was based in part on 
the undisputed fact that Limb's warranty deed was recorded after the bankruptcy trustee's 
notice of abandonment. [R. 664.] 
On appeal, the Smiths' now attempt to dispute the district court's finding that Limb's 
warranty deed was recorded after the notice of abandonment. The Smiths contend that there 
is no support for this finding in the record. The Smiths' belated attempt to challenge this 
finding should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, it is well-established that appellate courts will not consider matters raised for the 
first time on appeal. For example, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear the appellant's argument 
regarding the existence of an agency relationship, which was raised for the first time on 
appeal, even though the facts on the issue were undisputed. Id. at 654. The Utah Court of 
Appeals, in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), extensively discussed the 
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rule against the consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal and the narrow 
exceptions to that rule. Id. at 922-26. In Archambeau. the court refused to consider even a 
constitutional argument involving the appellant's liberty interest, which was raised for the 
first time on appeal, because no "exceptional circumstances" existed nor was "plain error" 
apparent. 
Under the analysis set forth in Archambeau and other Utah cases, the Smiths' argument 
should not be considered. The Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Limb's 
Motion for Summary Judgment listed the dates for the recordation of both the warranty deed 
and the notice of abandonment as undisputed facts and stated that the notice of abandonment 
was recorded before the warranty deed. [R. 547, 550-51, 554.] The Smiths did not dispute 
these facts. [R. 597-607.] Under Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, these uncontested facts were deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment. Having failed to challenge these facts or raise this point before the trial court, the 
Smiths have waived this argument on appeal. 
Second, even if this court decides to examine the merits of the Smiths' argument, their 
argument is obviously erroneous. The Smiths claim that there is no evidence in the record 
regarding when the warranty deed was recorded. Appellants' brief at 25. However, as 
demonstrated above, the record contains this information, and the district court expressly 
found that the warranty deed was recorded after the notice of abandonment. [R. 664.]3 
3The Request for Abandonment and Notice of Abandonment were recorded at the 
Washington County Recorder's office on September 16, 1991 as Entry No. 390753, in Book 
618, at Page 79. [R. 549, 577.] Security Title Company closed the sale from Tylers to 
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The Smiths next assert that the district court made a factual finding when it determined 
that the only evidence of their allegedly open, visible and exclusive possession of the 
property—the loose scrap metal on the vacant land-does not, as a matter of law, constitute 
open, visible and exclusive possession sufficient to place a buyer on constructive notice of 
the Smiths' asserted interest in the property. This argument fails to appreciate the scope and 
operation of summary judgment. 
Under Utah law, "actual possession . . . when open, visible and exclusive, will put on 
inquiry those acquiring any title to or a lien upon the land so occupied. . . . " Mathis v. 
Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 959 (1953). As the Smiths admit in their brief, the 
only evidence of Smiths' alleged possession consisted of only the allegation that there was 
some junk, including scrap steel, on the vacant property. Appellants' brief at 22-24. Even 
accepting this allegation as true, the district court correctly concluded that "there can be no 
genuine issue of fact that scrap steel on vacant land does not constitute open, visible, and 
exclusive' possession that could give constructive notice of a claim against title." [R. 665.] 
Evidence must rise above a minimum threshold before the evidence, can, as a matter of 
law, support a claim. See Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.. 784 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 
(Utah 1989) (concluding that alleged statement could not, as matter of law, be construed as 
fraudulent concealment); see also McNair v. Farris. 944 P.2d 392, 396 (Utah App. 1997) 
(discussing requirement that party present evidence sufficient to satisfy threshold of action in 
Limb and recorded the Warranty Deed after the bankruptcy notice of abandonment. [R. 
550-51, 585-86, 920, 1148.] In fact the Warranty Deed from Tylers to Limb was recorded 
on September 16, 1991 as Entry No. 39075, in Book 618, at Page 801. 
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order to survive motion for summary judgment). Here, the Smiths failed to produce any 
evidence that their alleged possession of the property was open and visible, let alone 
exclusive. If such scant evidence of junk on vacant land were legally sufficient to place 
prospective purchasers on constructive notice of a claim against title, purchasers could never 
be safe in purchasing any vacant land. To avoid the harsh results of being deemed on 
constructive notice of a claim against title, prospective purchasers in Utah would be forced to 
conduct an exhaustive inventory of all junk or items on the property, thoroughly investigate 
the ownership of all such items, and determine whether any owner claims an interest in the 
real property. For that specific reason, the Utah Supreme Court has limited the situations 
where possession can give constructive notice. Only where the possession is open, visible, 
and exclusive can constructive notice arise. Mathis, 261 P.2d at 959. Here, the district 
court correctly concluded that the presence of scrap metal on vacant land does not constitute 
exclusive possession as a matter of law. 
For the reasons state above, Limb is a bona fide purchaser under Utah case law and is 
consequently entitled to the protection of Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3. Accordingly, the 
district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Limb, and the summary 
judgment should therefore be upheld. 
C. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against 
Limb is Barred Because the Smiths Abrogated Their Claim of an Equitable Mortgage. 
The Smiths' claims to Limb's properties also fail as a matter of law because the alleged 
equitable mortgages were abrogated by agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers. 
20 
Even if it is assumed that the absolute warranty deeds given to the Tylers were intended 
to be equitable mortgages, it is black letter law that the parties may subsequently abrogate a 
conditional mortgage by agreement: 
The general rule is that where a mortgage is in the form of a deed absolute or a 
conditional sale, the parties may by a subsequent agreement abandon the debt, 
cancel the agreement to reconvey, and thus change the character of the transaction 
from that of a mortgage to that of an absolute conveyance: and although there is 
authority to the contrary, this rule has even been held applicable in the case of a 
subsequent parol agreement. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 520 (1971) (emphasis added). Indeed, it is generally accepted 
as the majority rule that a conditional conveyance for security can be converted to an 
absolute conveyance by agreement of the parties: 
It appears to be generally accepted that the doctrine, "once a mortgage, always a 
mortgage," has reference only to agreements entered into contemporaneously with 
the execution of the mortgage, and does not prevent the parties from subsequently 
entering into agreements which change the character of the instrument....and such 
agreements may be made by parol. 
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 771 (1960) (emphasis added). The Smiths themselves have acknowledged 
at least two separate agreements that abrogated the claimed equitable mortgages. 
First, on June 13, 1990, the Smiths and the Tylers entered into a stipulation agreeing to 
jointly list the properties for sale. [R. 896.] In this stipulation the Smiths and Tylers agreed 
to apply all proceeds from any sale of the properties to the debt owning to the Tylers and, if 
any excess money existed after repaying such debt, to distribute the excess proceeds to the 
Smiths. [R. 896-97.] The Smiths agreed to surrender all of their remaining interest in the 
properties within 21 months of the stipulation if the properties were not sold or if they had 
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not fully satisfied their debt to the Tylers. [R. 897.] On July 12, 1990, the bankruptcy 
court entered an order approving the stipulation. [R. 898-900.] Judge Eves correctly 
concluded that under the stipulation and the order entered by the bankruptcy court, the 
Smiths relinquished all right they may have had to the properties themselves, including the 
equity of redemption. [R. 666.] The Smiths' only interest related to the properties was to 
the overages, if any, obtained from the sale of the properties, fid.] 
Second, the Smiths themselves contend that the bankruptcy stipulation was replaced by 
an agreement they made with the Tylers on August 19, 1991. Under that agreement, the 
Smiths deeded water rights to the Tylers and "agreed to relinquish any claim to the subject 
real property in order to facilitate the sale of the property to Tylers' purchaser." [R. 
549-50.] According to the Smiths, the Tylers agreed to pay them $40,000. The Tylers, on 
the other hand, assert that they agreed only to pay any overage to the Smiths. Although 
there may be a factual dispute between the Smiths and the Tylers as to the amount to be paid 
by the Tylers to the Smiths, there is no dispute that the Smiths agreed that the property could 
be sold free from any claim and that they would be paid some amount by the Tylers. Thus, 
the Smiths have admitted that they renounced their interest in Limb's properties. 
Though the alleged August 19, 1991 agreement was oral, oral agreements within the 
statute of frauds are enforceable to extent that a party acknowledges the existence and terms 
of the agreement. See Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984). Here, the Smiths 
acknowledge the agreement by alleging both its existence and terms. As shown above, the 
agreement, as alleged by the Smiths, extinguished the Smiths' interest in Limb's properties. 
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Whether the Tylers have performed their part of the alleged agreement or are liable to the 
Smiths for monetary damages is irrelevant to the consideration of whether the Smiths may 
once again assert an equity of redemption in Limb's properties. 
Based on the existence of these agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers, the 
Smiths agreed to abrogate any claim to an equity of redemption in Limb's properties. At 
most, the Smiths have had a claim against the Tylers for breach of contract, the monetary 
terms of which are disputed between the Smiths and the Tylers. Both agreements 
extinguished the Smiths' equity of redemption; therefore, the district court's entry of 
summary judgment clearing title to Limb's property was correct and should be affirmed. 
D. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against 
Limb is Barred by Principles of Equity. 
The district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Limb and against the Smiths 
should also be affirmed on the basis that the Smiths' claim is barred on the basis that equity 
will not aid those who have done inequity. See generally 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 126-
137 (1996). Though the district court did not rely on this legal theory in granting summary 
judgment, Utah courts have clearly established that summary judgment should be affirmed on 
any legal basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by the court in granting 
summary judgment. See Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.. 836 P.2d 797, 805-06 (Utah App. 1992). 
Courts universally recognize that parties whose conduct has been inequitable should not 
be aided by equity. This principle, often referred to as the "clean hands" doctrine, is 
summarized by America Jurisprudence Second as follows: 
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The frequently stated maxim that "whoever comes into equity must come with 
clean hands" is an ancient and favorite precept of the equity court. The principle 
announced is recognized as being a fundamental of equity jurisprudence. The same 
principle is expressed in the language that whoever has done inequity shall not have 
equity. 
The equitable doctrine of clean hands expresses the principle that where a 
party comes into equity for relief he or she must show that his or her conduct has 
been fair, equitable, and honest as to the particular controversy in issue. . . . 
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 126 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Utah courts also adhere to this 
principle. See, e ^ , Coleman Co. v. Southwest Field Irrig. Co.. 584 P.2d 883, 884 (Utah 
1978). As the name "equity of redemption" implies and as the Smiths note in their brief, the 
equity of redemption is a creature of equity. Appellants' brief at 14-15. The doctrine of 
clean hands, therefore, applies with full force to the Smiths' claim against the title to Limb's 
property. 
Under the facts of this case, the Smiths are not entitled to receive the equitable benefit 
of an equity of redemption on Limb's properties. As noted above, the Smiths have on 
multiple occasions expressly disclaimed any and all interest in the properties purchased by 
Limb. As a result of these various statements, the properties were released from the Smiths' 
bankruptcy, the Tylers agreed to convey the properties by warranty deed, and Limb (an 
indisputably innocent party) purchased the properties. 
The Smiths' statements related to their bankruptcy proceeding is particularly revealing 
of their inequitable conduct. The following excerpts from Perm Smith's deposition expose 
his evasive and fraudulent conduct: 
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Q. Now, is it correct the reason you were sending this letter to Mr. Gillman [the 
bankruptcy trustee] was to convince him to have the properties released out of 
the bankruptcy? 
A. The purpose I wrote this letter was because we had been converted to a 
Chapter 7 involuntarily, and I was trying to get out of the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. And I was trying to get everything I could out of the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, and that's essentially why I wrote the letter. Between what Mr. 
Tyler and I discussed he would do if he did send this letter, it fit in with me 
trying to get out of the bankruptcy, which I finally succeeded in doing. 
Q. Well, did you make any disclosures to the Bankruptcy Court when you filed 
this motion to release the properties to the Tylers that you still claimed some 
interest in it? 
A. I didn't make any disclosure to that effect that I can see. 
Q. In fact, you didn't tell the bankruptcy trustee that you still claimed an interest 
in the property? 
A. I filed a claim of interest in it in the beginning of the bankruptcy. 
Q. Right. But then you asked the bankruptcy --
A. To release it. 
Q. — to release it because you didn't claim an interest anymore? 
A. I didn't say I didn't claim an interest in it. I didn't say I did. I didn't say I 
didn't. 
Q. My question goes to whether you had a claim to the property or not because 
this [the Smiths' letter to bankruptcy trustee] says that you had no claim to the 
property. And I want to know whether that statement is true or not. 
A. I believe I had a claim to the property. I'll have to tell you that. I believe I 
had a claim to the property ever since I first borrowed money on the property. 
Q. After you sent this letter of February 11, 1991, to Mr. Gillman you never 
indicated to the Bankruptcy Court or to Mr. Gillman that you still had a ~ 
you still made a claim to the property; is that correct? 
A. I believe at that time I had already filed to dismiss the petition, and I was 
trying all ways I knew, being a pro se litigant and not being lawyer trained, to 
get it dismissed out of the bankruptcy, and this is one of the vehicles I was 
trying to use. 
Q. All right. After you sent Exhibit 15 dated February 11, 1991, to Mr. 
Gillman, bankruptcy trustee, and Exhibit 16, the Ex Parte Motion To Release 
Real Property, to the Bankruptcy Court, did you notify either Mr. Gillman or 
the Bankruptcy Court in any way that you still claim an interest in these 
parcels of property? 
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A. I don't recall ever doing that. 
[R. 1047; 1050-53 (emphasis added).] 
These comments reveal the Smiths' extreme self-interested behavior and willingness to 
deceive and prevaricate in pursuit of that self interest. As a result of their deceptive 
behavior, the Smiths were successful in having the properties released from bankruptcy. 
Their deceptions before the bankruptcy court should not be rewarded and aided by the 
court's equitable powers. Indeed, it would be inequitable and would sanction an outright 
fraud to permit the Smiths to disavow their representations to the bankruptcy court, the 
bankruptcy trustee and the Tylers and now claim an interest in the properties to the detriment 
of Limb. For these reasons, the Smiths' are not entitled to the aid of equity and their claim 
therefore fails as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
THE SMITHS' REMAINING CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND 
IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE FINAL ORDER 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Dismissing the Smiths' Remaining 
Claim for Failure to Prosecute. 
A district court's decision to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution will not be 
overturned on appeal absent a manifest showing of an abuse of discretion. Hartford Leasing 
Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
1995). In other words, the district court's decision must be without support in the record or 
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must be a plain abuse of discretion. See Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunlev. 16 Utah 2d 97, 100, 
396 P.2d 410, 412 (1964). This is a difficult standard to overcome for parties challenging a 
decision, particularly where, as here, the record contains abundant evidence supporting the 
district court's decision. 
The Smiths filed their complaint on October 8, 1992. [R. 1.] After the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Limb and against the Smiths on May 2, 1995, the 
Smiths failed to take further action to prosecute their remaining trial claim. In the meantime, 
though the district court had determined that the Smiths possessed no equity of redemption in 
Limb's property, the lis pendens filed against Limb's property continued to cloud Limb's 
title. 
Faced with the Smiths' persistent failure to prosecute their remaining claim against the 
Tylers, Limb brought a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in order to create a final 
appealable order.4 [R. 697-99.] At the September 23, 1996 hearing regarding Limb's 
motion to dismiss, the Smiths failed to present justifiable excuses for their failure to 
prosecute. The district court, which had the opportunity to observe first-hand the dilatory 
prosecution of the case, determined that dismissal was appropriate. Subsequently, the Smiths 
moved to set aside the judgment of the district court dismissing their remaining claim. [R. 
726-29.] The district court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Once again, however, the 
4In the alternative, Limb requested that the summary judgment order entered in favor of 
him be certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
[R. 697-99.] 
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Smiths failed to present any justifiable excuses for their delay. In fact, the Smiths neglected 
to even attend the hearing on their motion. [R. 785-86.] 
In the face of such consistently inexcusable dilatory conduct, the district court clearly 
was within its discretion in dismissing the Smiths' remaining claim. "Such nonaction is 
inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it constitutes abuse 
of the judicial process." Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Ct. App.), cert. 
denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). The Smiths were presented with "an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice," Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), but the Smiths "abused their opportunity through 
dilatory conduct." Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Ct. App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
On appeal, the Smiths allege that their lengthy delay is excusable because of alleged 
settlement negotiations. Many of the Smiths allegations on appeal were not presented to the 
district court and made part of the record. Therefore, these allegations are not relevant to 
this appeal. To the extent that such allegations were presented to the trial court and made 
part of the record, the district court found them to be either not credible or insufficient to 
excuse the Smiths' failure to prosecute their claims. 
The Smiths' erroneously focus their argument concerning the district court's dismissal 
of their remaining claim on whether Limb had standing to argue for the dismissal. Though 
this standing argument represents the Smiths' primary challenge to the dismissal, it merits 
little in the way of response. 
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First, whether Limb had any remaining interest in the case is completely irrelevant to 
the district court's decision to dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim. District courts possess 
the inherent power to control their dockets. See, e.g.. Power Train Inc. v. Stuver. 550 P.2d 
1293, 1294-95 (Utah 1976). Included within this authority is the court's power to dismiss on 
its own motion an action for failure to prosecute. In Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 
23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
dismissal for failure to prosecute may only occur upon the motion of one of the parties 
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 464-65. The Court stated: 
"In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed under 
the statute, or may, of its own motion, take action to that end. In acting on its own 
motion, the court must proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the record that the court's discretion 
has been abused." 
Id. (quoting Reed v. First Nat'l Bank. 241 P.2d 109 (Or. 1952) (emphasis in original)) 
(citing Beckman v. Beckman. 401 P.2d 810 (Id. 1965); Harris v. Harris. 196 P.2d 402 
(Nev. 1948)) (additional citations omitted); see also Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Ct. App.) (upholding trial court's sua sponte dismissal 
of case for lack of prosecution), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). Thus, while it 
may be true that Limb's motion requesting dismissal brought the Smiths' lack of prosecution 
to the court's attention, once the district court was aware of such want of prosecution, the 
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district court had the authority to dismiss the Smiths' claim even without a motion before the 
court.5 
Second, the Smiths' standing argument utterly fails to conduct any analysis as to the 
point at which Limb no longer had an interest in the case. The first hearing regarding the 
dismissal of the Smiths' claims was held on September 23, 1996. At that hearing, the 
district court indicated that it would certify the prior summary judgment in favor of Limb as 
final and would dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim for lack of prosecution. The Smiths 
suggest that Limb had no remaining interest in the case upon the instant that the district court 
stated that it intended to certify the summary judgment as final. This suggestion is clearly 
mistaken. Until the district court entered its final order on December 23, 1996, Limb had no 
assurance that the summary judgment motion in its favor would be an appealable final 
judgment. Without such assurance, Limb was free to make every legal argument supported 
by the facts of the case to achieve his goal of finally quieting title to his property. To hold 
otherwise would subject Limb to the whims of Smiths in prosecuting their claims, potentially 
5The Smiths' assertion that the district court may not exercise its power to control its 
docket without providing more advance notice is without merit. First, the Smiths cannot 
claim that they were unaware that their failure to prosecute their claims was an issue because 
they were on notice that Limb had moved to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution. 
Second, the Smiths presume too much in believing that their willingness to stipulate to 
certifying the partial summary judgment as final would somehow cure their failure to 
prosecute. See Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d at 1371 ("[A] trial court is not 
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which has not been incorporated in 
an order where the stipulation attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar." 
(citation omitted)). Finally, as discussed above, the Smiths were presented with an 
opportunity to convince the district court to set aside its final judgment dismissing their 
claims, but the Smiths neglected to attend the hearing on the issue. [R. 782.] 
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and actually tying up Limb's ability to convey his property for years. See Hidden Meadows 
Dev. Co. v. Mills. 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). Limb's interests should not be placed 
indefinitely in such limbo at the mercy of the Smiths to prosecute their claims to bring the 
case to an end. 
Third, a careful reading of the district court's final order, dated December 23, 1996, 
reveals that the district court did not certify the partial summary judgment as a final 
judgment and then dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim. Instead, the court adjudicated all of 
the Smiths' claims, either by summary judgment or dismissal for lack of prosecution, and 
then, having determined that it had adjudicated all claims in the action, the district court 
certified its December 23, 1996 judgment as a final judgment. [R. 730-33.] Though the 
Smiths indicated a willingness to stipulate that the partial summary judgment in favor of 
Limb be certified as a final judgment, the district court never entered a order pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) so certifying the summary judgment, but instead entered the final order 
adjudicating all of the Smiths' claims. Thus, the Smiths' standing argument has no basis in 
law or in fact and should, therefore, be rejected. 
Accordingly, the Smiths have failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion in dismissing their remaining claim for lack of prosecution. Therefore, the 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying the Motion to Set Aside 
the Final Order. 
A district court's decision regarding a motion for relief from judgment will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 
(Utah App. 1989). The Smiths' assert that the district court erred by denying their motion, 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the court's order 
dismissing their remaining claim. However, the Smiths have not provided one iota of 
analysis regarding this assertion. Appellees' brief, at 28-31. It is axiomatic that appellate 
courts will not consider issues not adequately briefed on appeal. See, e.g., Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Dec. 5, 1997). Here, the Smiths have failed to provide 
any analysis regarding the district court's refusal to set its order aside. Appellees' brief at 
28-31. Consequently, this issue should not be addressed on this appeal. Even if this issue is 
considered, the above analysis regarding the district court's entry of the motion to dismiss 
and the subsequent history (i.e., the Smiths' failure to attend the hearing regarding their 
motion to set aside) amply demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to set aside its order of dismissal. Therefore, the district court's denial of the 
Smiths' Rule 60(b) motion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Limb respectfully requests that the district court's summary 
judgment, dismissal and refusal to set aside its final order be affirmed. No genuine issues of 
fact are in controversy and the facts establish that Limb is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law; therefore, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in iavoi -i Linio. 
against the Tylers. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
tl . t,e district 
court's refusal to set aside its final order and Ime. rherefnre. :.--iled 10 sht=w an abuse of 
discretion. I'or ihese reasons, the summary juugmeni, wisnns-nii and rclu-^i to set as.Jc i;ie 
final order should be affirmed. 
DATED this 7-0 '"clay of April, 199S 
? -:R \\ \DDOUPS BR OWN (JEE X: I OVEI ESS 
Ronald G. "Russell, Esq. 
, Kcuwineyp for Defendant Russell J. Limb 
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Thomas M. Higbee, Esq. 
Steven D. Burge, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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APPENDIX 
•:AL 7TSTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STAT. F UTAH 
PENN HARRIS SMITH, 
MARY ANNE SMITH, and 
E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, 
a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W. 
TYLER, and RUSSELL J. LIMB, 
This mattvi ca;;.-^  before the court ;-: :••-. r ,?h J~ " " : r for 
hearing - ief°ndar. Mmb'j Hot-.on for Summary Judgment dated 
] . . ;_•;-;„ - r -^ :ant 
Russeii G- ry - •'-.•ndi^ twi; appealed on bei;dh oi_ 
plaintiffs -~^tr: Dun lap appeared < •* - - * f •:-.. -efendants 
behalf of third-par* y defendant security T:lie Company of 
Southern Utah. Based or the record in this matter, including the 
p l e a d i n g s a n d evident. ' i . ' MM I i I m I Hi I In t IHII I..,, .iml I In .irguiii -. 
of counsel, the court renders the following opinion and order. 
Plaintiffs' Senond Amended Complaint neeks a determination 
that plaiiiLitlo hold an equity r»f iLipLum in reil-ain ---1 
properties purchased by defendant Limb from defendants Russel" H. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT LIMB'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil N o. 920501015 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
Tyler and Ina W. Tyler ("Tylers"). Plaintiffs claim that 
warranty deeds by which title to the properties was conveyed to 
the Tylers were actually equitable mortgages and that plaintiffs' 
equity of redemption arising from those warranty deeds was never 
extinguished through foreclosure. Defendant Limb has moved for 
summary judgment on three grounds: (1) plaintiffs are judicially 
estopped from asserting an equity of redemption because of their 
specific disclaimer of any interest in the subject properties in 
prior bankruptcy proceedings; (2) plaintiffs cannot enforce an 
equity of redemption against defendant Limb who was a bona fide 
purchaser for value from the Tylers and, therefore, protected by 
the Utah Recording Act; and (3) the claimed equitable mortgages 
were abrogated by specific agreements between plaintiffs and the 
Tylers. 
1. Judicial Estoppel« 
Under Utah law, judicial estoppel prevents a party who has 
taken a position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on 
the basis of it from maintaining the opposite position in another 
action, Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980); see 
also Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 829 
P.2d 142, 148 n.4 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, plaintiffs specifically took the position in 
their prior bankruptcy case that they claimed no interest in the 
2 
*^ -+- nrnporf jp- : ? that the iToperties belonged ]- rhe 
February . 19- : aintiffs w::)ie ^ lette: to ;)ua, e :;. ^ i^lman, 
t- "rit^J "tates Bai^'^ur*-^" "rr!}-^e„ .... . rb^i* tiffs 
spe^iiiCujLxj represen:c. - .. 
claimed no interest r- the subject properties, >opc. E> "r" 
iui uue Februr*- •'*•"' "letter, 
plaintiffs tilt ; . ;.; uhe bankruptcy court . ..... _ . :c _. t: 
Release Real Property in which plaintifrr i -nci represented that 
trev .a , - • ' " . * je. 
Smith Depo. pp :-<4-c- . Further, plaint: if i, ; ^ .nn lio.i:. is S:;ita 
testified ?,+- h^° recent deposition that the reason, rucri 
represent ... .- . .. . 
properties wou • :i be released : rem the bankruptcy t*.. enable : at.-
T - It-"- to :":-•;] r1' -perties. c e e 1?. oiuiUxx bopc. pp. 26, 
The court further finds that it is undisputed 4that the 
kr-iek ...:..- ' - +-•-r + ^ c3 "ron tne r e D r e ^ c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ •-* plaintiffs 
ana their requ^^i t. .. t._. propert
 t _°.. . ..-. : _ -; ; > e i 
N o t i c cf Abandoning" in which :. »e- trusnee lour: .c, : c ;rcluced 
t • e • . *: r : ; • ' • -— : - •:!• oiC 
properties. See Aiiiudv,; Duano . ..e . 
Tylers relied en plaintiffs' disclaimer ct .r.y interest n the 
properties so they could be sold and warranted title to the 
properties to defendant Limb pursuant to a Warranty Deed- Tylers 
and their successor in title, defendant Limb, would be prejudiced 
if plaintiffs are not estopped from disavowing the position taken 
in the prior bankruptcy proceedings. 
Because defendant Limb is in privity of estate with the 
Tylers, having received his title to the subject properties by 
way of a deed from the Tylers, defendant Limb is entitled to 
invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) (holding that judicial estoppel "is 
applicable to defendants here, as successors in interest of the 
real property involved in both cases"). 
2. Utah Recording Act. 
Under Utah law, an unrecorded conveyance is "void as against 
any subsequent purchaser of the same real property" where the 
subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in good faith and 
for valuable consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994). A bona fide purchaser for value 
entitled to the protection of the recording act is "one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to 
put him on notice of the complainant's equity." Blodgett v. 
Martsh, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). 
4 
The c o u r t f i n d s • 5 at: :* 3 u n d i s p u t e d ' " a t d e f e n d a n t Limb 
iiii i i t e r e s t in 
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was r e c o r d e d . * 1 : o c oi Abandonment s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t 
t i t ; • :
 : * • " T ; 4 - - ' — i iu 
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h 
f oui J the recorded 1 tlce o* -bandonmeiit : r a ; !.»•- , ^ . U K U : 
t *"' ;rt'"r ~ * *rv : "•'**; i r ' •" h ; '*' "irkri'nt'.'v' fpicrpn w^u" "i have 
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conclusion was oased en plaintirrs' specific' discla nier of zny 
!••'•-*. --* " T rd.ie.o. -ee Affidrwi" " ^irr1'' H, Giiliaa^ 
5, -. Detenaant L,;.:. .^CU : .; -:-.v-- •-;-.- *. -..;.-a 
bankruptcy trustee's conclusion c to aggressive!.- nvestigate 
ar
-
 7
'
 ;
 "'*' ' .^
i
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 JJversif ied Equities v. 
American Savings ana Loan Association, "; <\. * i ; - - . 
App. 198 7;. 
JL JL 
Plaintiffs argue that constructive notice can also be given 
by possession and assert that there are disputed fact issues 
regarding plaintiffs7 possession of the properties. Under Utah 
law, "actual possession . . . when open, visible, and exclusive, 
will put upon inquiry those acquiring any title to or a lien upon 
the land so occupied. . . . " Mathis v. Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 
P.2d 952, 959 (1953). The only evidence of possession submitted 
by plaintiffs is the testimony of plaintiff Penn H. Smith that 
there were certain items of "junk" including "scrap steel and 
things of that nature" on what was otherwise vacant property. 
See P. Smith Depo. p. 103. The court concludes that there can be 
no genuine issue of fact that scrap steel on vacant land does not 
constitute "open, visible, and exclusive" possession that could 
give constructive notice of a claim against title. 
3. Abrogation of Equitable Mortgages. 
Even if the court were to assume that the absolute warranty 
deeds given to the Tylers by plaintiffs were intended to be 
equitable mortgages, the parties may subsequently abrogate a 
conditional mortgage by agreement. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 
520, at 508 (1971). Plaintiffs themselves in this case have 
alleged at least two separate agreements that abrogated the 
claimed equitable mortgages. First, plaintiffs and the Tylers 
entered into a stipulation in connection with plaintiffs7 
6 
bankruptcy case that provided that the properties would be sold 
free • :: f a IT; ; ell! z * 1 
to the bankruptcy cu. i t. Upu^ x^o>.-.i .oi. . . at .- t .gUiG',-'..,,, 
the proceeds of . 
S e c e r n V: ~" ,-* 
Second, plaint, i t r z *:. lege in their 
t-; permit Tyler': : , i * n< \ ropert:cc frer c£ pl a : n t i i f s ' 
Sllil 
P l a i n t i f f : assort that * ;v statute oi : rauds .• ->uid operate 
p e r m i t the propertie. tc it . ' * :L^ • ^ .u . i: . ^  os, howu-vei , 
-f-sr** » *r -^ n^r, i *-+- - t "^  , -"^xistepr*^1 y * *•"' > i<~*^ i •* • <• TrPPme*~ i " r •"'«•* 
d e f e n c e. ; Her, t if- J. Potter, 694 r.. j c ,tah 1 9 K 4 ) . 
^ --\ >- +" W ,-v. -£ ^ K~ p , ,-* y-, - J >- ^  O <— ' •• J-* ^ 
1 ..:•„;. 
t h e i r i n o t i o r ff r ^ vr <::-y j u d g m e n t , t h e 
ar^ . ~~ - - - : — ; r i t > o f m a t e r i a ] f->~+-
e ^ i i L . c a ^ . j ; a^ a mat-*:. 
: o n c i u o e s t h a t t h e r e 
* 1 ^ f o n d a n t Limb i s 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Limb's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The court will enter a 
judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as 
against defendant Limb, thereby adjudicating that plaintiffs have 
no claim to the subject properties and awarding costs as provided 
by law. 
DATED this 273 1( day of , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
JT^Philip Ev« 
listrict Court Judge 
8 
. , j i)a j)j r |g Qg |^a | | ( j p e | j v e | y 
hereby certify that on this £7k day of 
19 J_[ -"-,-? c-r:es of the above and foregoing document, first class 
postage pre-paia to •--; uii, .v*. g J. W- • -d the copies in counsel's folder: 
Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
150 North 200 East 
Suite #202 
Craig S. Dunlap, Esq. 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, UT 84770 
Steven D. Burge, Esq. 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar ON, UT M7>> \ 0726 
Ronald ~ P. 05 
P. O Box r - ! i 
4iM r* 
" I 
.6 LLC 24 P?\ 3 53 
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STATE OF UTAH 
PT^ NN HARRIS SMITH, MARY ANNE 
TU. and E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, a 
partnership. 
vs. 
RICHARD H. TYLER, iNA W l"i IT I1 
and RUSSELL J LIMP 
. nits. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920501015 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter came before the court on September 23, 1996 on Defendant Limb's 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution or, Alternatively, p- ~ i. • .. ,« Summary 
Judgment as Final. Ronald G. Russell anoeared on behalf of Russell J. Limb ("Limb"). 
Michael B. Hughes appeared on behalf of Richard H. Tyler and Ina W T-- 'er C,nn !ers"). 
Douglas D. Terry appealed mi In lull' m iin." piiiinlills H.IM'II mi flic n n er, 
the court having determined to grant said motion, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum Opinions dated April 27, 
1995 granting the summary judgment motions of defendants Limb and Tylers, the plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice as against Limb, 
and the First and Second Causes of Action in the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are 
dismissed with prejudice as against Tylers. 
2. The court hereby adjudicates and declares that plaintiffs have no right, title, 
equity, lien, or interest in the following-described real property located in Washington 
County, Utah: 
PARCEL 1: 
All of Lot 19 of the CANYON BREEZE R.V. RESORT, according 
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County 
Recorder of said County. 
PARCEL 2: 
All of Lot 45 of the CANYON BREEZE R. V. RESORT, according 
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County 
Recorder of said County. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning at a point North 89°15'05" East 769.50 feet, along the 
Section line from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 42 South, Range 15 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 00°37' 
East, 356.17 feet; thence North 89°23' East 202.37 feet; thence North 
00°37' West, 189.02 feet; thence North 51°03'56" West, 262.49 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2 
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PARCEL 
Beginning at a point North 89°23' East 611.05 feet along the 40 line 
and North 00°37' West 260.00 feet from the Southwest Corner of the 
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 
42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 00°37* West 438.46 feet; thence South 89°23' West 
43.00 feet; thence North 00°37* West 150.0 feet; thence South 
38°04'36w West 179.63 feet; thence South 00°36' East 349.82 feet; 
thence South 29°25'44" East 114.13 feet; thence North 89°23' East 
99.06 feet to the point of beginning. 
m
 Third Cause "f Action in plaintiffs' Second .Amended Complaint is di^i? .. 
.'.-ution. 
For the reasons set forth in 'the couit's Order Granting Third-P.trty Defendant 
: :U:IL> KU. , , _ L . . .armiiary Judgitieiil (Lilcd il"VLi\ M !N'i * * .y 
Compiaiai of Tylers is dismissed with prejudice. 
^ The court, grants judgment in favor' of Limb and against plamtiffs in the amount 
M t iHis of this ;ii lion totalinr $ ^ f / A / O 7^2 • 
< The court, grants judgment in favor of Tylers and against plaintiffs .in, the amr—* 
of costs of this i< lion totaling $ "755"- SS ^fC 
i Tlic ( ourt grants judgment in favor of 'third-party defendant Security T'-'.h 
Company and against I j lers in the amount oil i o«;i\ nl this at inm lolaling -- .>/, ^ -> 
g# xhe court having adjudicated all claims in this action and finding no just reason 
for delay hereoy certifies this judgment as a final judgment. 
^ c 
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DATED this ^ ? —day of Oetefeep, 1996. 
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